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RECENT DECISIONS
CONCLUSION
In spite of the restrictions placed on the hot cargo clause by the
Supreme Court, the clause still has considerable vitality. Union rep-
resentatives, especially in the trucking and construction fields, will con-
tinue to utilize it to preserve their traditional sentiment against work-
ing with non-union articles or personnel. Two factors tend to support
this conclusion. Primarily, few secondary employers will dishonor
their collective bargaining agreement when they must later bargain
with the same representatives of what is usually, though not always,
a union shop. Another consideration which must be developed more
fully by union leadership is the fact that only the freedom to strike
is denied the union by §8(b) (4) (A); the union retains its other
powers to persuade the employer to abide by his contract. To these
employers who seek to negate the affect of an existing hot cargo
clause more latitude is given. Since the union must appeal directly to
the secondary employer to enforce the provision, his decision in most
circumstances will control as to whether there will be a valid secondary
boycott. Assuming that the union makes its request properly and the
there is acquiescence, the primary employer's only recourse will be
found in common carrier situations. In such cases the primary em-
ployer may, relying on Galveston,"' claim before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission that secondary employer is engaging in a dis-
criminatory practice.
RICHARD PERRY
Federal Taxation-Refund Suit-Full Payment Prerequisite-
Taxpayer suffered losses on the sale of certain commodities and
futures and reported them as ordinary losses. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue characterized the transactions as capital losses, levy-
ing a deficiency assessment in the amount of $28,908.60, including in-
terest. After making two payments totaling $5,058.54, taxpayer sub-
mitted a claim for refund of that amount which was disallowed by the
Commissioner. Petitioner then challenged the correctness of the de-
ficiency by bringing the present suit for refund under 28 U.S.C.
§1346 (a) (1). The United States moved to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. The District Court for the District of Wyoming felt that
because petitioner had not paid the full amount of the deficiency he
should not maintain the action. But because the Court of Appeals
had not resolved the question, the case was decided on its merits for
the United States. On taxpayer's appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the 10th Circuit, the judgment was vacated and the case remained with
instructions to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a claim.
18 Ibid.
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held: A tax-
payer must pay the full amount of an income tax deficiency before
challenging its correctness by an action for refund in the United
States district court. Walter W. Flora v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct.
1079 (1958).
Tax practitioners now have the Supreme Court's answer to a juris-
dictional problem which has been the center of considerable recent
discussion.1 Some authorities apparently felt the issue was clear-cut
in favor of the taxpayer 2 while others were apprehensive of such
view,3 pointing to a possible upheaval in established tax practice which
might result.
The Court's decision, written by Chief Justice Warren, involves,
for the most part, a construction of the jurisdiction statute4 governing
refund suits against the United States in district courts. The words
"action... for the recovery . . . of any sun ' 4a might cause one to feel
that §1346 (a) (1) is unambiguous, but that would be to reckon with-
out the principle of strict construction to waivers of sovereign im-
munity 5 and the sharp conflict which existed between the lower federal
courts.6
Section 1346 was originally enacted as §1310 (c) of the Revenue
" See McDowell, Traps in Refund Claims and Filing Returns, PRoc. N.Y.U.
17th IN sT. ON FED. TAX. 485, 492 (1958) ; Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax
Assessment Before Suing In The District Court?, 8 JOURNAL OF TAXATION 179(1958) ; Notes, 44 CAL. L. REv. 956 (1956), 2 HOWARD L. J. 290 (1956).
2 E.g., 3 CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE §11.5 (1955) : "Even though the assessed
liability has not been fully paid, the courts have uniformly held that a tax-
payer may maintain suit for the portion of the assessment which has been
paid, whether the suit is against a collector (citing Sirian Lamp Co. v. Man-
ning, 123 F. 2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941) and Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126 F.
Supp. 769 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).) or the United States (citing Coates v. U.S.,
III F. 2d 609 (2d Cir. 1940).) ; whether the taxpayer has paid or rightfully
owes the balance of the assessment is a matter of defense but does not affectjurisdiction of the court involved."
3 Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax Assessment Before Suing In the District
Court? 8 JOURNAL OF TAXATION 179 (1958); Note, 2 HOWARD L. J. 290, 298
(1956).
468 Stat. 589,28 U.S.C. 1346 (a) (1) (1954). "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of :(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority
or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully col-
lected under the internal-revenue laws; ......
4a It would seem that the remaining two clauses in §1346 (a) (1) dealing With
the recovery of "any tax" or "any penalty" do not necessarily negative an
action after part-payment as they appear to be at most neutral on the subject.
-United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656 (1931).
6 See Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F. 2d 776 (3rd Cir. 1941) ; Coates v.
United States, 111 F. 2d 609 (2d Cir. 1940); Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126
F. Supp. 769 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Rogers v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 409
(E.D.N.Y. 1957); Bushmaier v. United States, 230 F. 2d 146 (8th Cir. 1956) ;
McFarland v. United States, 4 P-H 1957 Fed. Tax Serv. para. 72,798; Jones
et al v. Fox, 4 P-H 1957 Fed. Tax Serv. para. 72,880; Flora v. United States,
142 F. Supp. 602 (D. Wyo. 1956), 246 F. 2d 929 (10th Cir. 1957).
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Act of 1921.7 Since its essential language seems to have been copied
from R.S. 3226, the predecessor of the present claim for refund stat-
ute, §7422 (a)," the Court was impressed by the construction which
R.S. 3226 had received in its earlier decisions, despite the disparity of
factual conditions between them and the present case. In Cheatham v.
United States,9 the Court, by way of obiter dictum, stated:
"... While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is
allowed within the departments before the money is finally
exacted, the general government has wisely made the payment
of the tax claimed, .. ., a condition precedent to a resort to the
courts by the party against whom the tax is assessed."'01 [Em-
phasis supplied.]
From the tenor of this brief statement, it would not seem to nec-
essarily demand full payment, as the language could have as readily
referred to payment of merely that tax for which suit is brought. It
is obvious to even the most unsophisticated tax mind that some tax
must be paid before it can be recovered. The actual holding of the
Court in the Cheatham case was that no right of suit lay where the
taxpayer had failed to appeal from an assessment of the Commissioner.
But the above dictum was felt persuasive in the present case, inasmuch
as the Cheatham case was decided after the clause beginning "any
sum" was added to R.S. 3226, and later cases had included similar
language." These factors caused the present Court to feel that "a
construction requiring full payment would be more consistent with
established meaning of the statutory language," even though the lan-
guage in each case might have been uttered without thought of the
legality of part-payment refund suits.
Of additional impetus was the narrow-stated purpose of Congress
in enacting the predecessor of §1346 (a) (1), that of removing the
jurisdictional amount limitation of the Tucker Act in the special
situation where the collector could not be sued.12 The similarity of
the pertinent language left no doubt in the minds of the present Court
that the terms of the jurisdictional provision were copied from the
7 42 Stat. 311, 28 U.S.C. §1310 (c) (1921).
8 68 A. Stat. 876, 26 U.S.C. §7422 (1954) "(a) No suit prior to filing claim for
refund.-No Suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed
with the Secretary or his delegate, according to the provisions of law in that
regard, and the regulations of the Secretary or his delegate established in
pursuance thereof."
9 92 U.S. 85 (1875).
'0 Ibid at 89.
". Kings County Savings Institution v. Blair, 116 U.S. 200,205 (1885); Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,609 (1894) (dissenting opinion) ;
Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118,120 (1915); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm.,
279 U.S. 716,721 (1929).
12 See 61 Cong. Rec. 7507 (1921).
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claim-for-refund statute. The fact that the language of the latter had
for many years been considered to require full payment before suing
the collector, and the fact that the avowed purpose of the 1921 amend-
ment was merely to cure an inadequacy in suit against the collector,
combined as cogent indications that no change was intended in the
full-payment principle declared in the Cheatham case.
1 3
Thus, the apparent conflict in the various circuits 14 has been re-
solved. But, it is submitted, the certainty of the instant decision may
produce some harsh cases as an attendant result. There are, doubtless,
many taxpayers who can not pay the full amount of the deficiency
assessment before bring refund suit. Of course, the immediate an-
swer of the Government is that the Tax Court is the proper forum for
such taxpayers. But perhaps the time for appeal to the Tax Court
has elapsed, or the taxpayer fears a jeopardy assessment which will
preclude the advantages of the Tax Court.1 5 And the availability of
jury trial in the district court as well as the seemingly undeniable fact
that the district court judge has a more practical approach to tax
litigation 16 is another answer to the Tax Court proponent. The ab-
sence of any award for attorney's fees and witness expenses despite
13 See notes 9 and 10 supra.
14 See Coates v. United States, 111 F. 2d 609 (2d Cir. 1940): "It is pressing
technicality beyond all bounds to say that a taxpayer who has made a return
on an excessive basis and has paid installments which are more than the
correct amount of tax before discovering his error, must pay the remaining
installments indicated by the incorrect return on pain of losing his remedy
to recover the overpayment. The proposition has neither reason nor authority
in its favor." (But the seemingly adamnant language is nothing more than the
frustrating dicta as the taxpayer had actually made full payment before the
trial.) ; Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F. 2d 776 (2d Cir. 1940) ; (It should
be noted that this suit was against the Collector and that the Court stressed
the absence of privity between the defendant and the United States. This
argument is no longer valid because of the change which INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §7422 (c) has wrought. See Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp.
769 (N.D.N.Y. 1954). But cf. a later decision from another district court
in the 2d Circuit, Rogers v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
Presumably the Court in the Rogers case was not impressed with the words
of the Court in the Hanchett case: "If an overriding policy of taxation re-
quires a different result, it would appropriately come from an appellate
court."). Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F. 2d 146 (8th Cir. 1956) : "The
proceeding to recover a partial payment can in no wise jeopardize or impede
the government in the collection of its revenue. So far as the taxes involved
in the instant suit are concerned the government has received the money and
as to the balance it can at once proceed to collect without let or hindrance
invoking the drastic remedies provided by law for that purpose." (But when
the taxpayer in the instant Flora case argued before the Court of Appeals
for the 10th Circuit that the suit was but a claim for refund for an amount
of tax actually paid and did not include a review of the total assessment or
the remaining deficiency not paid, the court curtly answered: "Such approach
is unrealistic and serves only to conveniently defeat the established purpose
and function of the tax court." 246 F. 2d at 931.)
1S This argument appeared to favorably impress the Court in Bushmiaer v.
United States, 230 F. 2d 146 (8th Cir. 1956).
16 See Dockery, Refund Suits in District Courts, 31 TaxEs 523 (1953). The
conclusion drawn therein is that your most favorable forum in tax litigation
is a district court.
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the outcome of the case in the Tax Court'- is another weighty factor
in the decision as to which forum to seek. What with the apparent
conflict between the case law of the Tax Court and that of the various
Courts of Appeals, s a taxpayer faced with adverse precedents in the
former is almost forced to sue in the District Court or incur the ex-
pense of appeal. But of far greater importance is the often-ignored
fact that certain taxes such as the excise tax cannot be litigated in the
Tax Court.19 To require a taxpayer contesting the assessment of a
deficiency of such taxes to pay the entire tax and then litigate, even
when the taxpayer is without funds to accomplish full payment, seems
to the writer to work such hardship that it is a matter of concern,
albeit the Supreme Court in the instant case felt it was properly that
of Congress.
2 0
The language of the creators of the Board of Tax Appeals was
thought by the Court to support its decision. But it would appear that
this argument, like Janus, is two-sided, for the House Committee
stated:
"The right of appeal after payment of the tax is an in-
complete remedy, and does little to remove the hardship oc-
casioned by an incorrect assessment. The payment of a large
additional tax on income received several years previous and
which may have since its receipt, been either wiped out by
assets, or spent, sometimes forces taxpayers into bankrupcy,
and often causes great financial hardship and sacrifice. These
results are not remedied by permitting the taxpayer to sue for
the recovery of the tax after this payment. He is entitled to an
17Lore, When Should a Tax Case be Taken to Court: The Many Costs of
Litigation, 3 JOURNAL OF TAXATION 2 (1955).
is See Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Court of
Appeals Precedent, 57 CoLuM. L. REv. 717 (1957), where it is shown that
often the Tax Court will ignore a decision of the exact Court of Appeals to
which the litigant may appeal from the Tax Court.
19 Jones et al. v. Fox, 162 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1958), stressing the divisibility
of the excise tax. The Court made a rather astute observation that: "While
in the Flora case a deficiency assessment was levied prior to the part payment
of said assessment by the taxpayer and, consequently, prior to the filing of a
claim for refund or suit for refund, in the instant case the taxpayer first
made payment of fifty dollars and simultaneously filed a claim for refund.
By statutory mandate of Section 7422(e) of Title 26 U.S.C.A., 111, had this
claim for refund been one for income tax and had it been disallowed, the
taxpayer perfecting his suit in this Court prior to the issuance of notice of a
deficiency assessment, the result would have been 'to give the taxpayer the
choice of which court (the district court or Tax Court) shall have jurisdic-
tion.' Why this choice expressly given by Congress or why 'concurrent jur-
isdiction in the district court (or Court of Claims) and in the Tax Court
over the same case' explicitly recognized by Congress should be subject to
defeat by the mere administrative act of assessing a deficiency prior to the
rejection of a jurisdictional prerequisite to any suit, is open to serious question,
a question not answered by the Supreme Court decision in Flora as the Court
did not cite, comment upon or consider the effect of subsection (e) of section
7422."; McFarland v. United States, 4 P-H 1957 FED. TAx SERV. para. 72, 798.
20 78 Sup. Ct. at 1086.
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appeal and to a determination of his liability for the tax prior
to its payment."2 1
Though the House Committee was speaking in favor of the
creation of the forerunner of the Tax Court, its language would ap-
pear applicable in favor of the litigant who must seek relief in the
District Court and cannot pay the full tax prior to suit.
It would seem that an unqualified holding that full payment of
the deficiency is a condition precedent to refund suit is somewhat in-
consistent with the judicially-developed doctrine allowing injunctive
relief against tax assessments or collections in extraordinary circum-
stances where the taxpayer will suffer irremediable damage if he is
not permitted such remedy. The Supreme Court appars to have
sanctioned this doctrine in the comparatively early case of Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida.2 2 The lower federal courts
continue to apply its rationale in current cases.2 3 If the Miller case is
still of efficacy in the eyes of the present Supreme Court, its reasoning
should be just as persuasive in the case of the partial-paying taxpayer
seeking refund (in the exceptional case hypothesized above), as
§7421 (a) ,24 which prohibits injunctive relief, was to the Court in the
instant case. 25 Assuming that the Court would recognize such an ex-
ceptional refund case,26 then there would not appear to be a pressing
need for Congressional action by way of amendment to the refund
statutes. But if the Court in the instant case meant its words to have
literal effect,2 7 they seem to dictate a necessity for relief by way of
legislative action. Perhaps in the course of Congressional debate, the
21H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924). The Senate Committee
on Finance made a similar explanation. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
8 (1924).
22284 U.S. 498 (1932).
23 Admittedly the injunctive remedy is granted by some courts only if valuable
intangible assets of the taxpayer would be lost without possibility of recovery
of the loss in money if distraint of tangible assets were not enjoined. Compare
Midwest Haulers Inc. v. Brady, 128 F. 2d 496 (6th Cir. 1942) and John M.
Hirst and Co. v. Gentsch, 133 F. 2d 247 (6th Cir. 1943), with Mongev.
Smyth, 229 F. 2d 361 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 976 (1956).
24 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §7421 (a) : ". . . no suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
25 See 78 Sup. Ct. at 1086. "For many years that principle (of paying first and
litigating later) has been reenforced by the rule that no suit can be maintained
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax."
26 See Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax Assessment Before Suing in the District
Court?, 8 JOURNAL OF TAXATION 179, 181 (1958): "If a taxpayer is permitted
in extraordinary circumstances to enjoin the collection of tax which could be
collected by seizure of his property, he should be permitted in extraordinary
circumstances to sue for refund of a partial payment where he can't pay
the full deficiency assessed."
2 78 Sup. Ct. at 1086: "It is suggested that a part-payment remedy is necessary
for the benefit of a taxpayer too poor to pay the full amount of the tax.
Such an individual is free to litigate in the Tax Court without any advance
payment. Where the time to petition that Court has expired, or where for
some other reason a suit in the District Court seems more desirable, the
requirement of full payment may in some instances work a hardship. But
since any hardship would grow out of an opinion whose effect Congress
[Vol. 42
RECENT DECISIONS
merits of the unmentioned policy reasons 28 that apparently controlled
the instant decision could be put to an exacting test.
ADRIAN P. SCHOONE
Lack of Good Faith in Collective Bargaining-Petitioners in
collective bargaining negotiations insisted upon a broad management
function clause without an arbitration clause of real value, and also
demanded a no strike clause in the contract. The employees' repre-
sentatives achieved only the concession of grievance and security
clauses which gave the union little voice in the determination of such
matters. Petitioners had also, prior to the bargaining sessions, granted
a unilateral wage raise to certain employees, and had allegedly made
threats and promises to their employees. The National Labor Relations
Board found that the strike that followed was not an unfair labor
practice strike, because the petitioners had failed to bargain in good
faith in failing to concede anything substantial, and in granting the
wage increases. The petition to set aside the order of the Board was
granted respecting the findings and order relating to refusal to bar-
gain in good faith, and to the determination that the strike was an
unfair labor practice strike. White's Uvalde Mines v. NLRB, 42
LRRA 2001 (5th Cir., April 23, 1958).
The statute pertinent here is §8 (d) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act:'
"(d) For the purpose of this section, to bargain collectively
is the performance of the mutual obligation of employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession: ......
This subsection was inserted in the National Labor Relations Act to
give more definiteness to §8 (a) (5)2 of the original Act, which made
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to bargain collectively with
in successive statutory revisions has made no attempt to alter, if any amelior-
ation is required it is now a matter for Congress, not this Court."28 Riordan, supra note 26, admits that a holding of part payment as sufficient
to bring suit would not prevent the Government from utilizing its drastic
remedies. But he feels that such use would produce an unsatisfactory tax
administration because 1) it would affect the taxpayers' willingness to per-
form under our voluntary assessment program; 2) it would be burdensome
to the Government; 3) it might cause hardships to those doing business with
the taxpayer. But the query remains whether these arguments completely
offset the dire circumstances in which many a taxpayer now finds himself.129 U.S.C.A. §158 (d).
229 U.S.C.A. §158 (a) (5).
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